Towards a Phenomenology of Moral Choice

In this post, I propose to work towards a phenomenology of moral choice. Allow me to broadly construe what I take to be a few mainline positions on the topic:

1. Moral choice according to a Eudaemonistic Ethics is in choosing the appropriate good at the appropriate time. So what brings about the choice or what justifies the experience of a moral choice is a hierarchy of goods; what should be chosen at a given time is what pertains properly to one's ultimate fulfillment.
   
2. Moral choice according to a Rationalistic Ethics is choosing between what one ought to do and what one desires to do. So what brings about the moral choice is the principle of reason and some irrational principle.
3. Moral choice according to a Value Ethics is choosing between what ought to do in response to something of intrinsic value and importance and the importance of subjective satisfaction. The choice is brought about by value and want for subjective satisfaction where it is in competition with value.
   

Though there are many other moral theories out there, I think many who stand within the Christian tradition of philosophy fall somewhere within these three categorizations. Also I have found that they are often debated about. And they offer, as I think we can bring out, very different views on the moral life.

I will go ahead and say that I most firmly stand within the third category. I think it is the position which most adaequately accounts for our moral experience. But without here going into a further expose as to why I hold this to be the case, I would like to open this post up for discussion, so that hopefully I can open up more of my own position along with those of others though dialogue.