- Moral choice according to a Eudaemonistic Ethics is in choosing the appropriate good at the appropriate time. So what brings about the choice or what justifies the experience of a moral choice is a hierarchy of goods; what should be chosen at a given time is what pertains properly to one's ultimate fulfillment.
- Moral choice according to a Rationalistic Ethics is choosing between what one ought to do and what one desires to do. So what brings about the moral choice is the principle of reason and some irrational principle.
- Moral choice according to a Value Ethics is choosing between what ought to do in response to something of intrinsic value and importance and the importance of subjective satisfaction. The choice is brought about by value and want for subjective satisfaction where it is in competition with value.
I will go ahead and say that I most firmly stand within the third category. I think it is the position which most adaequately accounts for our moral experience. But without here going into a further expose as to why I hold this to be the case, I would like to open this post up for discussion, so that hopefully I can open up more of my own position along with those of others though dialogue.
9 comments:
I can see how this will become a discussion of the phenomenological implications on moral decision making. The first question I would ask is: "How are these 'intrinsic values' recognized as the objects of value-based decision making?"
To answer your question Andrew, what I mean by intrinsic values are beings that have a moral importance which is unconditional. And as an aside what i mean by importance is the way in which something is able to become the source of motivation for the will. So when I say that a human person is important what I mean is that the person has intrinsic value which becomes a source of moral duty, obligation, 'ought'. Or that the person stands behind categorical imperatives. I hope that gets at your question.
I have some leading questions for you. I think these areas will help flesh out our discussion. Answer only the questions that will move your point forward and ignore those that will not. Would you hold that the experience of these values is prior to any form of reflection or judgment? If so, then how does our psychological experience and the influences on us effect the way in which we personally create a hierarchy to different types of values? (ie. what makes me choose something like food over God at times) Is there a way to establish a hierarchy to the values which represents their innate value over the value given to them once I have reflected and chosen? (or in other words how can values be given objective significance and order if we only ever experience them as subjects effected by our pasts) How do we account for some significant differences in which values are stressed in different societies?
There is a lot to be said in answer; but I think I see what issues are:
1. To what extent is there a hierarchy of goods or values?
2. To what extent is our experience of goods and values objective, and relatively our understanding of their hierarchical position?
3. Does the subject's psychological condition contribute to the constitution of goods and values?
4. How do we account for cross cultural goods/value estimation differences?
These are some good questions; but i want to make sure I have them right. If so, I propose we take on number three.
Yes those questions get at the issues I was raising. I think approaching number 3 would be good.
I suppose another question to throw into the bunch is: what renders your approach to these questions phenomenological? What are the methodological implications, or what advantage does the phenomenological method have that other approaches to moral issues lack?
Pax Christi,
Pat's question is definitely important here. Perhaps departing from Matthew's 'question 3' will bring this to light, since examining value from the psychological locus of the human person seems to be precisely what we intend by 'phenomenology.'
To Patrick, I take that to be a good question or couple of questions. There are different ways of doing phenomenology. As an undergraduate I became very fond of realist phenomenology, mainly from the IAP school and what people like Father Sokolowski at CUA would call realist phenomenology. Phenomenology to me is just a way of accessing the philosophical tradition, just a way of doing philosophy. What broadly renders my approach to these questions phenomenological is this: a very close attentiveness to the data of lived experience. If I am going to make a claim or examine a claim, I must find a way to justify it within my experience of the world. I do this by reading others, talking with others, and looking into my own experience. In other words, my systemic process is carefully established upon the evidence of experience. I think there are many advantages to this methodology, but one of the ones which I find most appealing is that it avoids broad generalizations and works to overcome conceptual vagueness and systematic incoherence. I hope that helps.
M.D.
That sounds good. Wage ahead!
Pax Christi,
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